A Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Team with Mixed Players

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Outline of talk

- Mean Field Teams (MFTs) Cooperative (i.e., social optimization)
 - Recall mean field games (MFG) noncooperative
 - with peers (i.e., comparably small players)
 - with mixed players (i.e., with a major player)
 - Motivation for cooperation
 - Parallel development (peers, mixed players, etc)
- > This talk: MFTs with mixed players and dynamic coupling
 - Method: person-by-person optimality; two-scale variations due to dynamic coupling (neither usually used in MFG)
 - **Result**: Social optimality theorem

Mean Field Game: A major player A_0 and minor players A_i , $1 \le i \le N$

Dynamics (Huang'10):

$$dx_0(t) = [A_0x_0(t) + B_0u_0(t) + F_0x^{(N)}(t)]dt + D_0dW_0(t), \quad t \ge 0, dx_i(t) = [A(\theta_i)x_i(t) + Bu_i(t) + Fx^{(N)}(t) + Gx_0(t)]dt + DdW_i(t),$$

Costs:

$$J_{0}(u_{0},...,u_{N}) = E \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left\{ \left| x_{0} - \Phi(x^{(N)}) \right|_{Q_{0}}^{2} + u_{0}^{T} R_{0} u_{0} \right\} dt, J_{i}(u_{0},...,u_{N}) = E \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left\{ \left| x_{i} - \Psi(x_{0},x^{(N)}) \right|_{Q}^{2} + u_{i}^{T} R u_{i} \right\} dt,$$

 $x^{(N)} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_i, \ \Phi(x^{(N)}) = H_0 x^{(N)} + \eta_0, \ \Psi(x_0, x^{(N)}) = H_{x_0} + \hat{H} x^{(N)} + \eta_0$

Different variants are possible

MFGs: 1 major and N minor players:

1) Simultaneous strategy selection (Nash game and variants)

- Huang (2010); Nguyen and Huang (2012) LQG
- Nourian and Caines (2013); Carmona and Zhu (2015); Bensoussan et al. (2015)
 Nonlinear diffusion; conditional mean field
- Buckdahn, Li, and Peng (2014)
 nonlinear diffusion, minor players have coordination
- Sen and Caines (2016) noisy information
- 2) Strategy selection with leadership
 - Wang and Zhang (2014) Discrete time
 - Moon and Basar (2015); Bensoussan et al (2016) Continuous time
 - Kolokoltsov (2015) Principal agent

Motivation for cooperative decision (mean field team)

- Manage space heaters in large buildings (hotel, apartment building, etc); they can run cooperatively to maintain comfort and good average load (as a mean field)
- Kizilkale and Malhame (2016) considered related collective target tracking reflecting partial cooperation; linear SDE temperature dynamics



LQ Mean Field Team (social optimization) with peers:

Dynamics and costs (Huang, Caines, Malhame, 2012):

$$dx_i = A(\theta_i)x_i dt + Bu_i dt + DdW_i, \qquad 1 \le i \le N,$$

$$J_i = E \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left\{ |x_i - \Phi(x^{(N)})|_Q^2 + u_i^T R u_i \right\} dt,$$

where $\Phi(x^{(N)}) = \Gamma x^{(N)} + \eta$, $x^{(N)} = (1/N) \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_i$.

- **Objective**: minimize social cost: $J_{soc}^{(N)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} J_i$.
- Main Results:

$$|(1/N)J_{\mathrm{soc}}^{(N)}(\hat{u}) - \inf_{u \in \mathcal{U}_o}(1/N)J_{\mathrm{soc}}^{(N)}(u)| = O(1/\sqrt{N} + \bar{\epsilon}_N),$$

where $\hat{u} = (\hat{u}_1, \dots, \hat{u}_N)$, $\hat{u}_i = -R^{-1}B^T(\prod_{\theta_i} \hat{x}_i + s_{\theta_i}(t))$; \mathcal{U}_o : centralized controls.

Nonlinear extension: Sen, Huang and Malhamé (CDC'16)

MFT: 1 major and *N* minor players:

Simultaneous strategy selection to minimize social cost $J_0 + \frac{\lambda}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} J_i$

- Huang and Nguyen (IFAC'2011) LQ
 - <u>Method and result</u>: Uses state space augmentation; Only partial solution
- Huang and Nguyen (IEEE CDC'16)

$$dx_0 = (A_0x_0 + B_0u_0)dt + D_0dW_0,$$

 $dx_i = (Ax_i + Bu_i)dt + DdW_i, \quad 1 \le i \le N.$

(Decoupled dynamics; players are coupled via the social cost.)

 <u>Method and result</u>: Person-by-person optimality; existence under standard positive (semi-)definiteness assumption for cost weight matrices

This talk considers the LQ MFT with

- a major player
- coupled dynamics

Example:

$$dx_{i,t}^{N} = (Ax_{i,t}^{N} + Bu_{i,t}^{N} + Fx_{t}^{(N)} + Gx_{0,t}^{N})dt + DdW_{i,t}, \quad 1 \leq i \leq N.$$

The dynamic coupling causes some very delicate difficulties

- This generates small but important perturbations
- Different from MFG

Dynamics of the major player A_0 , and N minor players A_i :

$$\begin{aligned} dx_{0,t}^{N} &= (A_{0}x_{0,t}^{N} + B_{0}u_{0,t}^{N} + F_{0}x_{t}^{(N)})dt + D_{0}dW_{0,t}, \\ dx_{i,t}^{N} &= (Ax_{i,t}^{N} + Bu_{i,t}^{N} + Fx_{t}^{(N)} + Gx_{0,t}^{N})dt + DdW_{i,t}, \quad 1 \leq i \leq N. \end{aligned}$$

(A1) The initial states $x_{j,0}^N = x_j(0)$ for $j \ge 0$. $\{x_j(0), 0 \le j \le N\}$ are independent, and for all $1 \le i \le N$, $Ex_i(0) = \mu_0$. $\sup_j E|x_i(0)|^2 \le c$ for a constant c independent of N.

Note: The condition of equal initial means can be generalized.

Related Literature MFT with coupled dynamics Model Person-by-person optimality Solution and social optimality

The cost for A_0 and A_i , $1 \le i \le N$:

$$J_{0}(u_{0}^{N}, u_{-0}^{N}) = E \int_{0}^{T} \{|x_{0}^{N} - \Phi(x^{(N)})|_{Q_{0}}^{2} + (u_{0}^{N})^{T} R_{0} u_{0}^{N}\} dt,$$

$$J_{i}(u_{i}^{N}, u_{-i}^{N}) = E \int_{0}^{T} \{|x_{i}^{N} - \Psi(x_{0}^{N}, x^{(N)})|_{Q}^{2} + (u_{i}^{N})^{T} R u_{i}^{N}\} dt,$$

where $Q_0 \ge 0$, $Q \ge 0$ and $R_0 > 0$, R > 0,

•
$$u_{-j}^{N} = (u_{0}^{N}, \dots, u_{j-1}^{N}, u_{j+1}^{N}, \dots, u_{N}^{N}), \quad x^{(N)} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{i}^{N},$$

• $\Phi(x^{(N)}) = H_{0}x^{(N)} + \eta_{0}, \quad \Psi(x_{0}^{N}, x^{(N)}) = Hx_{0}^{N} + \hat{H}x^{(N)} + \eta.$
The social cost:

$$J_{\mathrm{soc}}^{(N)}(u^N) = J_0 + \frac{\lambda}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N J_k,$$

where $u^N = (u_0^N, u_1^N, \dots, u_N^N)$ and $\lambda > 0$.

Recall the social cost:

$$J_{\mathrm{soc}}^{(N)}(u^N) = J_0 + \frac{\lambda}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N J_k,$$

where $u^N = (u_0^N, u_1^N, \dots, u_N^N)$ and $\lambda > 0$.

- Give a big share to \mathcal{A}_0
- ► If λ/N were replaced by 1, the limiting control problem would be too insensitive to the performance of the major player and become inappropriate.

Notation:

$$\begin{array}{l} \bullet \ u^{N} = (u_{0}^{N}, u_{1}^{N}, \cdots, u_{N}^{N}) \\ \bullet \ u_{-j}^{N} = (u_{0}^{N}, \dots, u_{j-1}^{N}, u_{j+1}^{N}, \dots, u_{N}^{N}), \ j \geq 0 \\ \bullet \ x^{(N)} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{i}^{N}, \ \hat{x}^{(N)} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{x}_{i}^{N}, \ \text{etc} \\ \bullet \ \hat{u}^{(N)} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{u}_{i}^{N} \\ \bullet \ \hat{x}_{-i}^{(N)} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i}^{N} \hat{x}_{j}^{N}. \\ \bullet \ \tilde{x}_{0}^{(N)} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i}^{N} \tilde{x}_{j}^{N}. \\ \bullet \ x_{0}^{\infty}, \ x_{i}^{\infty}, \ u_{i}^{\infty}, \ \text{etc. for the limiting model} \end{array}$$

• m, \hat{m}, \tilde{m} for the mean field

Existence of (centralized) social optimum

Fact: Since the optimal control problem minimizing $J_{soc}^{(N)}$ is strictly convex and coercive, there exists a unique optimal control

$$\hat{u}^N = (\hat{u}_0^N, \hat{u}_1^N, \dots, \hat{u}_N^N),$$

where each \hat{u}_i^N belongs to $L^2_{\mathcal{F}}(0, T; \mathbb{R}^{n_1})$.

What to do next?

▶ Use person-by-person optimality; perturb one component in \hat{u}^N ; for instance (similarly for a minor player)

$$J_{\mathrm{soc}}^{(N)}(\hat{u}_0^N, \hat{u}_1^N, \dots, \hat{u}_N^N) \leq J_{\mathrm{soc}}^{(N)}(\boldsymbol{u}_0^N, \hat{u}_1^N, \dots, \hat{u}_N^N)$$

► Construct two limiting variational problems: P_{A0} for the major player and P_{Ai} for a representative minor player

Related Literature MFT with coupled dynamics Model Person-by-person optimality Solution and social optimality

1. – The major player's variational problem

Consider variation $\tilde{u}_{0}^{N} \in L^{2}_{\mathcal{F}}(0, T; \mathbb{R}^{n_{1}})$. Let $(\hat{x}_{j}^{N})_{j=0}^{N}$ correspond to $(\hat{u}_{j}^{N})_{j=0}^{N}$, $(\hat{x}_{j}^{N} + \tilde{x}_{j}^{N})_{j=0}^{N}$ correspond to $(\hat{u}_{0}^{N} + \tilde{u}_{0}^{N}, \hat{u}_{1}^{N}, \dots, \hat{u}_{N}^{N})$. Then $d\tilde{x}_{0}^{N} = [A_{0}\tilde{x}_{0}^{N} + F_{0}\tilde{x}^{(N)} + B_{0}\tilde{u}_{0}^{N}]dt$, $\tilde{x}_{0}^{N}(0) = 0$, $d\tilde{x}^{(N)} = [(A + F)\tilde{x}^{(N)} + G\tilde{x}_{0}^{N}]dt$, $\tilde{x}^{(N)}(0) = 0$, $\tilde{x}^{(N)} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\tilde{x}_{i}^{N}$

The first variation of the social cost

$$\frac{1}{2}\delta J_0 + \frac{\lambda}{2N}\sum_{i=1}^N \delta J_i = E \int_0^T L_0^N(t)dt, \quad \text{linear functional of } \tilde{u}_0^N$$

where

$$L_0^N = [\hat{x}_0^N - (H_0 \hat{x}^{(N)} + \eta_0)]^T Q(\tilde{x}_0^N - H_0 \tilde{x}^{(N)}) + (\hat{u}_0^N)^T R_0 \tilde{u}_0^N + \lambda [(I - \hat{H}) \hat{x}^{(N)} - H \hat{x}_0^N - \eta]^T Q[(I - \hat{H}) \tilde{x}^{(N)} - H \tilde{x}_0^N]$$

Recall $E \int_0^T L_0^N dt$ is a linear functional of \tilde{u}_0^N .

Lemma (The first order variational condition) We have

$$E\int_0^T L_0^N(t)dt=0$$

for all $\tilde{u}_0^N \in L_{\mathcal{F}}(0, T; \mathbb{R}^{n_1})$.

Proof. Use person-by-person optimality.

1.1. The major player's limiting variational problem

$$d\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} = (A_{0}\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + B_{0}\hat{u}_{0}^{\infty} + F_{0}\hat{m})dt + D_{0}dW_{0}(t),$$

$$d\hat{m} = ((A + F)\hat{m} + B\bar{u} + G\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty})dt.$$

$$egin{aligned} d ilde{x}_0^\infty &= (A_0 ilde{x}_0^\infty + B_0 ilde{u}_0^\infty + F_0 ilde{m})dt, \quad ilde{x}_{0,0}^\infty &= 0, \ d ilde{m} &= ((A+F) ilde{m} + G ilde{x}_0^\infty)dt, \quad ilde{m}_0 &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Problem $P_{\mathcal{A}_0}$: Find \hat{u}_0^{∞} to satisfy the variational condition

$$E\int_0^T L_0^\infty dt = 0, \qquad \forall \ \tilde{u}_0^\infty \in L_{\mathcal{F}}(0, T; \mathbb{R}^{n_1})$$

where

$$L_{0}^{\infty} = [\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})]^{T}Q(\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty} - H_{0}\tilde{m}) + (\hat{u}_{0}^{\infty})^{T}R_{0}\tilde{u}_{0}^{\infty} + \lambda[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]^{T}Q[(I - \hat{H})\tilde{m} - H\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty}]$$

Method: construct an appropriate adjoint process (p_0, p) ,

The \mathcal{A}_0 -FBSDE (\bar{u}) :

$$\begin{split} d\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} &= (A_{0}\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + B_{0}\hat{u}_{0}^{\infty} + F_{0}\hat{m})dt + D_{0}dW_{0}, \\ d\hat{m} &= [(A + F)\hat{m} + G\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + B\bar{u}]dt, \\ dp_{0} &= \{-A_{0}^{T}p_{0} - G^{T}p + Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &- H^{T}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \xi_{0}dW_{0}, \\ dp &= \{-F_{0}^{T}p_{0} - (A + F)^{T}p - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &+ (I - \hat{H})^{T}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \xi dW_{0}, \end{split}$$

where $\hat{x}_0(0) = x_0(0)$, $\hat{m}(0) = \mu_0$, $p_0(T) = p(T) = 0$.

The optimal control (critical point) is

$$\hat{u}_0^{\infty} = R_0^{-1} B_0^{T} p_0.$$

Lemma The A_0 -FBSDE(\bar{u}) has a unique solution.

Proof: Identify a Hamiltonian with nonnegative state weight matrix; see next page.

Lemma.

$$\mathbf{Q} = \begin{bmatrix} Q_0 & -Q_0 H_0 \\ -H_0^T Q_0 & H_0^T Q_0 H_0 \end{bmatrix} \\ + \lambda \begin{bmatrix} H^T Q H & -H^T Q (I - \hat{H}) \\ -(I - \hat{H})^T Q H & (I - \hat{H})^T Q (I - \hat{H}) \end{bmatrix}$$

is positive semi-definite.

2. – The minor player's variational problem. Suppose \hat{u}^N yields the state processes \hat{x}_i^N , $j = 0, \dots, N$.

Consider (u_i^N, \hat{u}_{-i}^N) for a fixed $i \ge 1$, which generates

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$$\begin{aligned} dx_0^N &= (A_0 x_0^N + B_0 \hat{u}_0^N + F_0 x^{(N)}) dt + D_0 dW_0, \\ dx_j^N &= (A x_j^N + B \hat{u}_j^N + F x^{(N)} + G x_0^N) dt + D dW_j, \quad 1 \le j \ne i, \\ dx_i^N &= (A x_i^N + B u_i^N + F x^{(N)} + G x_0^N) dt + D dW_i. \end{aligned}$$

The variations of the state processes (0 initial conditions)

$$\begin{split} d\tilde{x}_{0}^{N} &= (A_{0}\tilde{x}_{0}^{N} + F_{0}\tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)} + \frac{1}{N}F_{0}\tilde{x}_{i}^{N})dt, \\ d\tilde{x}_{j}^{N} &= (A\tilde{x}_{j}^{N} + F\tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)} + \frac{1}{N}F\tilde{x}_{i}^{N} + G\tilde{x}_{0}^{N})dt, \quad 1 \leq j \neq i \\ d\tilde{x}_{i}^{N} &= (A\tilde{x}_{i}^{N} + B\tilde{u}_{i}^{N} + F\tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)} + \frac{1}{N}F\tilde{x}_{i}^{N} + G\tilde{x}_{0}^{N})dt. \end{split}$$

Related Literature MFT with coupled dynamics Model Person-by-person optimality Solution and social optimality

The first variations of the costs:

$$\begin{split} &\frac{1}{2}\delta J_0 = E \int_0^T \chi_0 dt, \qquad \frac{\lambda}{2N}\delta J_i = E \int_0^T \chi_i dt, \\ &\frac{\lambda}{2N} \sum_{j \neq i} \delta J_j = E \int_0^T \chi_{-i} dt \end{split}$$

where

$$\begin{split} \chi_{0} &= [\hat{x}_{0}^{N} - (H_{0}\hat{x}^{(N)} + \eta_{0})]^{T}Q_{0}[\tilde{x}_{0}^{N} - H_{0}\tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)} - \frac{1}{N}H_{0}\tilde{x}_{i}^{N}] \\ \chi_{i} &= (\hat{x}_{i}^{N} - (H\hat{x}_{0}^{N} + \hat{H}\hat{x}^{(N)} + \eta))^{T}\frac{1}{N}\lambda Q \\ &\quad \cdot (\tilde{x}_{i}^{N} - H\tilde{x}_{0}^{N} - \hat{H}\tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)} - \frac{1}{N}\hat{H}\tilde{x}_{i}^{N}) + (\hat{u}_{i}^{N})^{T}\frac{1}{N}\lambda R\tilde{u}_{i}^{N} \\ \chi_{-i} &= [(I - \hat{H})\hat{x}^{(N)} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{N} - \eta]^{T}\lambda Q \\ &\quad \cdot [(I - \hat{H})\tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)} - H\tilde{x}_{0}^{N} - \frac{1}{N}\hat{H}\tilde{x}_{i}^{N}] + O(\frac{1}{N^{2}}) \end{split}$$

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PbP optimality implies the variational condition:

$$E\int_0^T L_i^N dt = 0, \quad \forall \tilde{u}_i^N,$$

where

$$\begin{split} \mathcal{L}_{i}^{N} &= \chi_{0} + \chi_{i} + \chi_{-i} \\ &= \left[\hat{x}_{0}^{N} - (H_{0}\hat{x}^{(N)} + \eta_{0}) \right]^{T} Q_{0} (\tilde{x}_{0}^{N} - H_{0}\tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)} - \frac{1}{N} H_{0} \tilde{x}_{i}^{N}) \\ &+ \left[\hat{x}_{i}^{N} - (H\hat{x}_{0}^{N} + \hat{H}\hat{x}^{(N)} + \eta) \right]^{T} \frac{1}{N} \lambda Q \tilde{x}_{i}^{N} + (\hat{u}_{i}^{N})^{T} \frac{1}{N} \lambda R \tilde{u}_{i}^{N} \\ &+ \left[(I - \hat{H}) \hat{x}^{(N)} - H \hat{x}_{0}^{N} - \eta \right]^{T} \lambda Q \left[(I - \hat{H}) \tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)} - H \tilde{x}_{0}^{N} - \frac{1}{N} \hat{H} \tilde{x}_{i}^{N} \right] \\ &+ O(\frac{1}{N^{2}}) \end{split}$$

For the minor player, we introduce a limiting problem:

- Use a limiting model below to produce approximations of $(\hat{x}_0^N, \hat{x}^{(N)}, \hat{x}_i^N)$.
- Further approximate $(\tilde{x}_0^N, \tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)}, \tilde{x}_i^N)$ appropriately.

Consider

$$d\hat{x}_0^{\infty} = (A_0\hat{x}_0^{\infty} + B_0\hat{u}_0^{\infty} + F_0\hat{m})dt + D_0dW_0$$

$$d\hat{m} = ((A+F)\hat{m} + B\bar{u} + G\hat{x}_0^{\infty})dt$$

$$dx_i^{\infty} = (Ax_i^{\infty} + Bu_i^{\infty} + F\hat{m} + G\hat{x}_0^{\infty})dt + DdW_i,$$

where $\hat{x}_0^{\infty}(0) = x_0(0)$, $\hat{m}(0) = \mu_0$, $x_i^{\infty}(0) = x_i(0)$, and \hat{u}_0^{∞} has been determined by the variational problem of \mathcal{A}_0 .

$$\begin{split} d\tilde{x}_0^\infty &= (A_0\tilde{x}_0^\infty + F_0\tilde{m} + \frac{1}{N}F_0\tilde{x}_i^\infty)dt, \quad \tilde{x}_{0,0}^\infty = 0, \\ d\tilde{m} &= [(A+F)\tilde{m} + \frac{1}{N}F\tilde{x}_i^\infty + G\tilde{x}_0^\infty]dt, \quad \tilde{m}_0 = 0, \\ d\tilde{x}_i^\infty &= (A\tilde{x}_i^\infty + B\tilde{u}_i^\infty)dt, \quad \tilde{x}_{0,0}^i = 0 \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} L_{i}^{\infty} &= [\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})]^{T} Q_{0} (\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty} - H_{0}\tilde{m} - \frac{1}{N}H_{0}\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty}) \\ &+ [\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} - (H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + \hat{H}\hat{m} + \eta)]^{T} \frac{1}{N}\lambda Q\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty} + (\hat{u}_{i}^{\infty})^{T} \frac{1}{N}\lambda R\tilde{u}_{i}^{\infty} \\ &+ [(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]^{T}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\tilde{m} - H\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \frac{1}{N}\hat{H}\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty}] \end{split}$$

The new variational problem $P_{\mathcal{A}_i}$: Find \hat{u}_i^{∞} such that

$$E\int_0^T L_i^\infty dt = 0, \qquad \forall \ \tilde{u}_i^\infty.$$

Solution Method: identify adjoint processes.

Remark: non-commutativity!

Fact: $(\tilde{x}_0^{\infty}, \tilde{m})$ is not determined as the variations of the limiting dynamics in $P_{\mathcal{A}_i}$ since the control variation does not affect the first two equations.

Recall:

$$d\hat{x}_0^{\infty} = (A_0\hat{x}_0^{\infty} + B_0\hat{u}_0^{\infty} + F_0\hat{m})dt + D_0dW_0$$

$$d\hat{m} = ((A + F)\hat{m} + B\bar{u} + G\hat{x}_0^{\infty})dt$$

$$dx_i^{\infty} = (Ax_i^{\infty} + Bu_i^{\infty} + F\hat{m} + G\hat{x}_0^{\infty})dt + DdW_i,$$

and

$$d\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty} = (A_{0}\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty} + F_{0}\tilde{m} + \frac{1}{N}F_{0}\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty})dt,$$

$$d\tilde{m} = [(A + F)\tilde{m} + \frac{1}{N}F\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty} + G\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty}]dt,$$

$$d\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty} = (A\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty} + B\tilde{u}_{i}^{\infty})dt$$

Related Literature MFT with coupled dynamics Solution and social optimality

Now, for the limiting variational equations, we introduce the adjoint equations $((\hat{x}_0^{\infty}, \hat{m}) \text{ solved from } P_{\mathcal{A}_0})$:

$$\begin{aligned} dq_{0} &= \{-A_{0}^{T}q_{0} - G^{T}q + Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &- H^{T}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \zeta_{0}^{a}dW_{0} + \zeta_{0}^{b}dW_{i}, \\ dq &= \{-F_{0}^{T}q_{0} - (A + F)^{T}q - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &+ (I - \hat{H})^{T}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \zeta^{a}dW_{0} + \zeta^{b}dW_{i}, \\ dq_{i} &= \{-F_{0}^{T}q_{0} - F^{T}q - A^{T}q_{i} - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &+ \lambda Q[\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} - (H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + \hat{H}\hat{m} + \eta)] \\ &- \hat{H}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \zeta_{i}^{a}dW_{0} + \zeta_{i}^{b}dW_{i}, \\ \text{where } q_{0}(T) &= q(T) = q_{i}(T) = 0. \text{ We have } P_{\mathcal{A}_{i}}\text{ 's solution} \\ &\hat{u}_{i}^{\infty} &= (\lambda R)^{-1}B^{T}q_{i}. \end{aligned}$$

Lemma We have $(q_0, q) = (p_0, p)$.

Remark: Somehow unexpected. Good for reducing dimension.

Recall

$$d\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty} = (A_{0}\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty} + F_{0}\tilde{m} + \frac{1}{N}F_{0}\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty})dt,$$

$$d\tilde{m} = [(A + F)\tilde{m} + \frac{1}{N}F\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty} + G\tilde{x}_{0}^{\infty}]dt,$$

$$d\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty} = (A\tilde{x}_{i}^{\infty} + B\tilde{u}_{i}^{\infty})dt$$

Construction of the adjoint processes (q_0, q, q_i) :

- Suppose ũ_i[∞] = O(1). In the variational dynamics of (x̃₀[∞], m̃, x̃_i[∞]), the first two entries have magnitude O(1/N), and x̃_i[∞] = O(1).
- Two scales
- Homogenize by using the equation of \tilde{x}_i^{∞}/N .

So using **Lemma** $(q_0, q) = (p_0, p)$ where the RHS is from A_0 -FBSDE (\bar{u}) , the adjoint equations for the minor player are:

$$dp_{0} = \{-A_{0}^{T}p_{0} - G^{T}p + Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ - H^{T}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \xi_{0}dW_{0}, \\ dp = \{-F_{0}^{T}p_{0} - (A + F)^{T}p - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ + (I - \hat{H})^{T}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \xi dW_{0}, \\ dq_{i} = \{-F_{0}^{T}p_{0} - F^{T}p - A^{T}q_{i} - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ + \lambda Q[\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} - (H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + \hat{H}\hat{m} + \eta)] \\ - \hat{H}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \zeta_{i}^{a}dW_{0} + \zeta_{i}^{b}dW_{i}, \end{cases}$$

where $p_0(T) = p(T) = q_i(T) = 0$. Recall we have P_{A_i} 's solution $\hat{u}_i^{\infty} = (\lambda R)^{-1} B^T q_i$.

Remainder: Still need to determine \bar{u} !

Question: how to determine \bar{u} ?

Recall

$$dp_{0} = \{\cdots\}dt + \xi_{0}dW_{0}, dp = \{\cdots\}dt + \xi dW_{0}, dq_{i} = \{-F_{0}^{T}p_{0} - F^{T}p - A^{T}q_{i} - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] + \lambda Q[\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} - (H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + \hat{H}\hat{m} + \eta)] - \hat{H}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \zeta_{i}^{a}dW_{0} + \zeta_{i}^{b}dW_{i},$$

where $q_i(T) = 0$. And $\hat{u}_i^{\infty} = (\lambda R)^{-1} B^T q_i$.

Fact: $\bar{u} \approx \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} \hat{u}_{i}^{\infty} = (\lambda R)^{-1} B^{T} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} q_{i}$.

Lemma. Averaging the equations of q_i , the resulting SDE is equivalent to that of p(=q).

Consistency condition: Take \bar{u} to satisfy

$$\bar{u} = (\lambda R)^{-1} B^T p$$

Now the "closed-loop" FBSDE for the major player:

$$\begin{split} d\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} &= (A_{0}\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + B_{0}R_{0}^{-1}B_{0}^{T}p_{0} + F_{0}\hat{m})dt + D_{0}dW_{0}, \\ d\hat{m} &= [(A+F)\hat{m} + G\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + B(\lambda R)^{-1}B^{T}p]dt, \\ dp_{0} &= \{-A_{0}^{T}p_{0} - G^{T}p + Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &- H^{T}\lambda Q[(I-\hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \xi_{0}dW_{0}, \\ dp &= \{-F_{0}^{T}p_{0} - (A+F)^{T}p - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &+ (I-\hat{H})^{T}\lambda Q[(I-\hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \xi dW_{0}, \end{split}$$

where $\hat{x}_0^{\infty}(0) = x_0(0)$, $\hat{m}(0) = \mu_0$, $p_0(T) = p(T) = 0$.

Theorem: This FBSDE has a unique solution. Proof: Use a nice Hamiltonian matrix structure.

The two extra equations of the minor player:

$$\begin{aligned} d\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} &= [A\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} + B(\lambda R)^{-1}B^{T}q_{i} + F\hat{m} + G\hat{x}_{0}]dt + DdW_{i}, \\ dq_{i} &= \{-F_{0}^{T}p_{0} - F^{T}p - A^{T}q_{i} - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &+ \lambda Q[\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} - (H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + \hat{H}\hat{m} + \eta)] \\ &- \hat{H}\lambda Q[(I - \hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \zeta_{i}^{a}dW_{0} + \zeta_{i}^{b}dW_{i}, \end{aligned}$$

which can be uniquely solved.

Related Literature MFT with coupled dynamics Model Person-by-person optimality Solution and social optimality

The whole FBSDE of the minor player:

$$\begin{split} d\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} &= (A_{0}\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + B_{0}R_{0}^{-1}B_{0}^{T}p_{0} + F_{0}\hat{m})dt + D_{0}dW_{0}, \\ d\hat{m} &= [(A+F)\hat{m} + G\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + B(\lambda R)^{-1}B^{T}p]dt, \\ dp_{0} &= \{-A_{0}^{T}p_{0} - G^{T}p + Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &- H^{T}\lambda Q[(I-\hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \xi_{0}dW_{0}, \\ dp &= \{-F_{0}^{T}p_{0} - (A+F)^{T}p - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &+ (I-\hat{H})^{T}\lambda Q[(I-\hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \xi dW_{0}, \\ d\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} &= [A\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} + B(\lambda R)^{-1}B^{T}q_{i} + F\hat{m} + G\hat{x}_{0}]dt + DdW_{i}, \\ dq_{i} &= \{-F_{0}^{T}p_{0} - F^{T}p - A^{T}q_{i} - H_{0}^{T}Q_{0}[\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - (H_{0}\hat{m} + \eta_{0})] \\ &+ \lambda Q[\hat{x}_{i}^{\infty} - (H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} + \hat{H}\hat{m} + \eta)] \\ &- \hat{H}\lambda Q[(I-\hat{H})\hat{m} - H\hat{x}_{0}^{\infty} - \eta]\}dt + \zeta_{i}^{a}dW_{0} + \zeta_{i}^{b}dW_{i}. \end{split}$$

Theorem. This FBSDE has a unique solution.

Remark 1: General FBSDEs do not always have a solution.

Remark 2: We expect it is easy to have existence (as happens here) due to optimal control nature; different from games; even a two player LQ game may have no solution

Key error estimates

Proposition. Take a fixed $v \in L^2_{\mathcal{F}}(0, T; \mathbb{R}^{n_1})$ and let $\tilde{u}_i^N = \tilde{u}_i^\infty = v$ for both the N + 1 player model and the limiting variational problem. Then for some constant C we have

$$\sup_{t \leq T} E[|\tilde{x}_0^{\infty} - \tilde{x}_0^N|^2 + |\tilde{m} - \tilde{x}_{-i}^{(N)}|^2 + |\frac{1}{N}\tilde{x}_i^{\infty} - \frac{1}{N}\tilde{x}_i^N|^2] \leq \frac{C}{N^4}.$$

Performance gap

Social Optimality Theorem We have

$$|J_{\rm soc}^{(N)}(\hat{u}) - \inf_{u} J_{\rm soc}^{(N)}(u)| = O(1/\sqrt{N}),$$

where each u_j^N , $0 \le j \le N$ within u is in $L^2_{\mathcal{F}}(0, T; \mathbb{R}^{n_1})$, and

$$\hat{u}_0^N = \hat{u}_0^\infty = R_0^{-1} B_0^T p_0, \quad \hat{u}_i^N = \hat{u}_i^\infty = (\lambda R)^{-1} B^T p_i,$$

where (p_0, p_i) are solved from $P_{\mathcal{A}_0}$ and $P_{\mathcal{A}_i}$.

We can further show that p_0 is a linear function of $(\hat{x}_0^{\infty}, \hat{m})$.

We may choose \mathcal{F}_t as the σ -algebra $\mathcal{F}_t^{x,(0),W} \triangleq \sigma(x_j(0), W_j(\tau), 0 \le j \le N, \tau \le t).$

Thank you!